In this book, Professor Adkins undertakes an examination of certain key value-words in the period between Homer and the end of the fifth century. The behavior of these words both affected and was affected by the nature of the society in which their usage developed. The author shows how only with a complete understanding of the implications and significance of these value-words can the essence of the Greeks and their society be grasped.

This is an original and stimulating collection of articles by scholars trained in classics, moral philosophy, political science, literature, and intellectual history. Its principal objective is to convey to the modern reader a sophisticated understanding of Homeric and Classical Greek morality and how it differs from our own. Some of the articles focus primarily on Greek value concepts, especially the concept of arete. Others compare those concepts to modern notions of virtue and tolerance, as well as to the work of (...) contemporary literary figures and philosophers, including T.S. Eliot, Alasdair Macintyre, John Wallace, and Philippa Foot. Throughout, the juxtaposition of ancient and modern ideas and the worldviews they presuppose makes these readings both intellectually exciting and revealing. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and, more specifically, philosophy of quantum physics can be but special fields of a general philosophy of knowledge; and the problems arising in these fields can be evaluated properly only when they are seen under the perspective of the whole range of human knowledge. This paper deals with problems of quantum physics and, in particular, with the problem of scientific objects in quantum physics from the epistemological point of view previously defined in the author's books, A Philosophy (...) of Science and The Basis and Structure of Knowledge. The argument of the paper, however, has not been stated before in the direct and concise manner here attempted and may therefore contain elements of novelty even for those readers who are familiar with the books just mentioned. (shrink)

It is a widely held doctrine at the moment that metaphysical propositions are meaningless, are, in fact, not genuine propositions at all. This doctrine is supported by the contention that only propositions which are verifiable are significant: and it is held that metaphysical propositions do not fulfil this condition, and are consequently pseudo-propositions. Those who hold this view divide propositions into three classes: Tautologies; which are analytic, certain, and are guaranteed by the principle of contradiction. Factually significant propositions; which are (...) synthetic, hypothetical, and are capable of empirical verification. Pseudopropositions, which only appear to be propositions and are, in reality, meaningless nonsense. (shrink)

This is a subject of recurrent interest which calls for review from time to time; I believe the last word upon it can never be said. Several topical reasons might be cited for attempting to deal with it at the present time, but these could not be pursued to the relevant applications in such a short discussion. In fact the subject is obviously a difficult one to deal with at all briefly since it is so closely bound up with other (...) large subjects—causality, space–time, and so on. (shrink)

In all great moral issues the moralist must choose and choosing has a price.